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Abstract 
This paper presents a stylized model based on the principal-agent framework in the absence of 
monetary instrument as a compensation device to agents with privately known production costs. Our 
results identify a new tradeoff that arises from alternative compensation devices, as well as the 
associated implications on firm’s profitability and consumer welfare.  
Keywords: Contract Design, Set-complement Instrument, Personalization. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a stylized model based on the principal-agent framework in the absence of 
monetary instrument as a compensation device to agents with privately known production costs. This 
extension is motivated by both business and regulatory interests in personalized content deliveries in 
digital networks. In contrast with standard economic goods, personalization exhibits several unique 
characteristics. First, both the value (convenience) and cost (privacy concerns) that a user derives 
from consuming the goods is proportional to the amount of personal information shared, and thus are 
intrinsically correlated (Chellappa & Sin 2005). Second, price is not a strategic variable for the firm, 
as most personalization services are offered free of charge to the users. The wide array of web-based 
and mobile services offered by Microsoft (e.g. My MSNBC), Google (e.g. Google Health), Yahoo! 
(e.g. Yahoo! Sports), and most social networking sites (e.g. Facebook) displays similar features as the 
product being modeled in this paper.  
We show that the challenge associated with the lack of external instruments can be tackled by 
transforming the compensation schedule into a set-complement of the production variable. Our results 
identify a new tradeoff that arises from complementary compensation devices, as well as the 
associated implications on firm’s profitability and consumer welfare.  
2 MODEL 
The market is characterized by a monopolistic firm that offers free personalization services to a mass 
of consumers, who are heterogeneous in their privacy sensitivity, indexed by  1 2,   , 
unobservable to the firm.  The respective portions of consumers belonging to each of the two types 
are v  and 1 v , which is common knowledge. 
The firm’s objective is to optimally allocate personalization services to the two types of consumers to 
maximize profit.  It collects information  I  from users and incurs a constant variable cost 1  
(normalized to 1) in generating the corresponding personalized services.  The firm justifies this cost by 
designating a subset of the acquired information  i I  for commercial use.  Its profit from serving each 
consumer is defined as: 
  21,
2
i I bi i I     
where b    represents the efficiency at which the firm is able to generate revenues from the 
acquired information.  The quadratic term captures diminishing returns in revenue generation for a 
given set of information. 
Consumers face a tradeoff between enjoying the convenience provided by personalization and 
suffering the privacy costs associated with sharing the necessary information: 
 , , ( )U I i S I i    
In this expression, S aI  represents the value that a consumer derives from consuming 
personalization. a  denotes the marginal value that the service generates from each unit of information provided by the consumer, and can be interpreted as the technological efficiency of personalization 
deployed by the firm. 2 The cost component reflects privacy concerns of the consumers due to the 
                                              
1 This can be interpreted as a “resource cost” – the cost associated with the necessary computing resources in providing 
personalized content to a request (Liu et al. 2010). 
2 ( )S I  can also take a quadratic form, which implies a diminishing return  of personal information on personalization 
convenience. With this specification, however, the basic intuition underlying results still holds. 
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firm’s exploitation of their information  i . Consumers with higher values of   are more privacy 
sensitive and thus experience greater discomfort associated with secondary uses of their information. 
Consistent with most industry practices, prior literature on personalization typically assumes that the 
firm fully exploits all information gathered from the consumers, i.e. i I (Chellappa & Shivendu 
2010).  In this case, consumers’ decision on whether to subscribe the proposed personalization 
services depends on the relative magnitudes of the efficiency coefficient a  against their type 
coefficient  . We label consumers with 2 a   “privacy seekers”, and those with 1 a   
“convenience seekers”.  Consumers of type 2  reject the personalization offer, whereas those of type 
1  choose to disclose as much information as possible.  From the firm’s perspective, the optimal level 




OP v b   from serving 
only type 1  consumers, who enjoy a utility level of   1 1 1OCS a b   .  
Consider the scenario where the firm can make an ex-ante credible commitment that a portion of the 
acquired information would be excluded from any secondary use, denoted as privacy preservation 
  , which is ex-post verifiable and enforceable through consumer auditing and government 
sanctions.  Consumers’ privacy concerns thus arise only from its complement  i I   ; i.e. 
privacy seekers and convenience seekers are served by  1 1,I Ii   and  2 2,I Ii   respectively.  The 
firm’s objective function can be represented by  
         1 1 2 2
2 2




2 2I I I I
I I I I I I I I
i i
v bi i i v bi i i
 
 
                    
 
s.t. IRs, ICs, and 1 2, 0I I    
where 1 2, 0I I    is referred to as the non-negative preservation constraint in the rest of this paper. 








              

 .  
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Optimal contract under information asymmetry 




     

. This condition rules out 
information rent being the trivial explanation for market shutdown as observed in standard models. 
The following proposition characterizes the shape of the optimal menu under varying degrees of 
technology efficiency. 
Proposition 1. There exists a unique 1 2( , )a    that partitions the interval 1 2( , )  , such that 
for 1( , )a a  ,













   





















              
;  
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for 2[ , )a a   , 
 



















































           

,  
where    * *1 1 2 1 2 0I IA a i i        on 2[ , )a  . 
(All proofs are relegated to the Appendix). 
Proposition 1 states that the form of the optimal contract varies depending on whether a  falls below 
or beyond the critical value a .  When technology efficiency is low  1i.e. ( , )a a  , the firm induces 
participation of both types of consumers and provide them with different levels of privacy 
preservation. The nonzero preservation for convenience seekers is surprising at the first glance, as 
preservation constitutes to pure cost for the firm, while it could have been substituted by 1i  as 
compensation for this segment instead.  Nonetheless, the firm finds it optimal to offer 1  because 
privacy preservation serves as a device that delivers the information rent (i.e.,  2 1 2i  ) more 
efficiently.  If no preservation is provided to the convenience seekers and information rent is solely 
delivered through 1i , then the firm will be faced with excessive overproduction.  Therefore, incurring 
the additional cost in exchange for a less-severe distortion in the convenience-seeking segment is of 
the firm’s best interest. 
Another observation from this proposition is that commercial use of information on type 1  increases 
from 1 1i b   to * 11Ii b a

  .  This ostensible overproduction is unfamiliar in standard models 
(Laffont & Martimort 2002), where the efficient segment always produces at the same level regardless 
of information asymmetry.  This counter-intuitive result reflects the change that occurs in the firm’s 
cost structure due to the need to incorporate preservation in maintaining incentive compatibility.  In 
sum, serving the inefficient type not only imposes the conventional tradeoff between production 
efficiency of the inefficient type and information rent of the efficient type, but also induces the firm to 
deliberate on which compensation schedule to rely on when serving the efficient segment. 
When technology efficiency is high  2i.e. ( , )a a   , the utilitarian difference between the 
commercially used portion  1i  and the preserved portion  1  of information becomes more subtle 
for convenience seekers.  Even if the firm fully relies on 1i  to deliver the required rent, the associated 
overproduction is less significant. Gradually, the substitution effect between 1i  and 1  favors 
tolerating overproduction over incurring additional cost in serving the convenience seekers.  When a  
exceeds a  such that 11i b a

   alone can generate sufficient information rent, the original incentive 
constraint of convenience seekers become slack and the optimal contract offers no preservation to this 
segment of consumers.  The slackness in IC on one hand allows the firm to revert to the original cost 
structure when serving convenience seekers, while on the other enhances production efficiency of 
both types of consumers.  Therefore, the conventional underproduction problem for the inefficient 
4
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type is moderated, while production of convenience seekers regresses toward 1i .  The additive 
components in *1IIi  and *2IIi  reflect the corresponding production adjustments. 
3.2  Welfare implications of privacy-preserving contract and improvements in 
personalization technology 
The optimal set-complement contract engages the otherwise non-participating market segment 
(type 2 consumers), and enables the firm to attain higher profit levels than the original schedule 
 1 , 0OI .  The following proposition quantifies the firm’s profit under the new contract with varying 
degrees of technology efficiency. 
Proposition 2. The firm’s equilibrium profit: for 1( , )a a  ,     2 2* *1 21 12
I I IP v i v i
       ; for 
2[ , )a a   , 















It can be verified that I OP P .  Such an increase in profit can be attributed to both inducing 
participation from the privacy seekers and adopting the more efficient cost structure in response to 
potential deviation of convenience-seeking consumers.  Moreover, a privacy preserving contract also 
leaves larger consumer surplus to this segment (i.e., 1 1I OCS CS ), while consistently leaving privacy 
seekers with zero utility. For 1( , )a a  , increasing technology efficiency  a  improves the vendor’s 
cost efficiency without exerting any impact on allocation efficiency.   
The second part of Proposition 2 describes the relative magnitudes of IP  and IIP . The negative 
component reflects that the ability for the firm to realize benefits from improvements in technology 
efficiency is diminishing: once 1  degenerates to zero, the firm lacks an effective device to extract 
further increase in consumer surplus of the convenience-seeking segment (previously, extracting this 
improvement is implemented through substituting 1  for 1i ). The non-negativity of privacy 
preservation hence affects the allocation of surplus between the firm and consumers. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1, where the dotted lines in the interval 2( , )a   represent the firm’s profit and surplus of type 
1  consumers for the contract menu under the original trajectories. 
 
Figure 1.       Surplus allocation with varying levels of technology efficiency 
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As technology efficiency exceeds 2 , both types exhibit characteristics of convenience seekers and 
are served by the same contract  1,0b  . Incentive compatibility of the contracting menu is no 
longer a concern.  Instead, the inability to extract the additional consumer surplus also pertains to the 
type 2  consumers.  In this case, profit becomes independent of technology efficiency; additional 
investments bring no further improvement to the firm’s profitability. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Improvements in technology efficiency not only affect the relative attractiveness of the two 
instruments as compensation devices, but may also change the distribution of consumer characteristics.  
In particular, our results show that technological improvements do not always enhance the firm’s 
profitability, since technological improvements also associate with larger difficulty for the firm to 
extract the increased consumer surplus.3 Ongoing work aims to refine the allocation of personalization 
under a continuous-type setup where the two aforementioned effects simultaneously influence the 
firm’s optimal investment decision. 
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3 If “price” can be charged for personalization services, difficulty in extracting consumer surplus will never be an issue. Then 
improving the efficiency of personalization technology will be a more attractive strategy to the firm. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.  We first assume 1 2, 0I I    to be inactive at the equilibrium. The solution 
process is similar to that for the standard discrete-type model.  However, the following lemma 
indicates that *1I  does not always stay above zero.  
Lemma. There exists a unique a  in the interval 1 2( , )   at which *1 ( )I a  intersect 0  . 
Proof: it can be verified that *1 1( ) 0I    and *1 2( ) 0I   . Moreover, *1 ( )I a  is strictly concave in a .  
The uniqueness of a  follows from the concavity of *1 ( )I a . Q.E.D. 
This lemma implies that, for 2[ , )a a   , ignoring the inequality 1 0   results in an incorrect 
specification for the equilibrium 1 .  Instead, we impose the restriction that *1 0II   at the 
equilibrium.  In this case, the incentive constraint of convenience seekers and the participation 
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v b v bi i i
aa a a
      
  
                                          
 . 
It can readily verified that the solution corresponds to the second part of the proposition. Compared 
with production under complete information,  
 
    
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           
  

  and 
    


























The respective inequalities in the proposition follow from     2 2 1 1 1 0b a ba

  
          
 for 
2[ , )a    , which can be easily verified by a) its second derivative w.r.t. a  is negative; b) 
    2 2 1 1 1 0b a ba

  
          
 at 2a  ; and c)     2 2 1 1 1 0b a ba

  
          
 at 
a   . 
Since * *21 21II IIi b b ia

      for 2( , )a a   , the monotonicity condition holds. 
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